Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1982

Harley Jepsen and Lima Jepsen v. Mark Tenhoeve
et al : Brief of Appellant on Appeal
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
W> Scott Barrett; Barrett & Mathews;
James C. Jenkins; Malouf, Malouf & Jenkins;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Jepsen v. Tenhoeve, No. 18090 (Utah Supreme Court, 1982).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2714

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

---0000000--HARLEY JEPSEN and
LIMA JEPSEN,

)

)

Plaintiff/Appellant.
)

Case No. 18090

vs.
)

MARK TENHOEVE, STEVE BROWN,
and INTERWEST PACIFIC CORP.,
a Utah corporation,

)
)

Defendant/Appellee
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

Appeal from the Decision of the District Court of Cache
County, State of Utah, the Honorable VeNoy F. Christofferson,
Judge, setting aside Jury Verdict

in Favor of the Plaintiffs and

Against Defendant Mark Tenhoeve.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000--HARLEY JEPSEN and
LIMA JEPSEN,

)
)

Plaintiff/Appellant
)

vs.

Case No. 18090
)

MARK TENHOEVE,_ STEVE BROWN,
and INTERWEST PACIFIC CORP., )
a Utah corporation,
)

Defendant/Appellee
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs filed this action against two Individual and
one Corporation Defendant in May of 1980 asking for damages
for breach of agreement against all three Defendants and asking further for damages from the sale of their dairy herd and
young stock.

Plaintiffs alleged that the Individual Defendants

induced them to sell their dairy herd, upon which they depended
for their livelihood.

The Individual Defendants also induced

Plaintiffs to sell their young stock for the sum of $14,000.00,
which $14,000.00 was appropriated by the Defendants.
While all Defendants appeared by the

sa~e

counsel, the

Answer of Defendant Brown was later stricken by the Court for
his failure to appear for his deposition.

Prior to trial,
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Defendants' attorneys withdrew their representation as attarneys for Brown and Interwest Pacific Corporation and the Corporation and Brown were not represented at the trial.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was heard before the Honorable VeNoy Christofferson
and a jury on August 25th and 26th, 1981.
The Jury returned a Verdict against Mark Tenhoeve for
$4,000.00 and against the Defendant Interwest Pacific Corp.
for $40,000.00 on the 26th of August, 1981.

This Verdict was

not entered in the Judgment Book and, on September 18, 1981,
the Court ordered the Verdict and the Judgment entered nunc pro
tune as of August 26, 1981.
On the 28th of September, 1981, Defendant's counsel
mailed and filed a Memorandum in Support of Defendant
Tenhoeve's Motion for Dismissal and Directed Verdict or
Alternatively, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict.

This

Memorandum was not supported by Motion nor had any Motion previously been made for a Directed Verdict.

Plaintiff's counsel

filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of a
Motion to Strike on the ground that the Jefendant's Memorandum
\

was not timely.
On the 6th day of October, 1981, Defendant's counsel filed
a Motion to Vacate the Judgment on the ground that it was
rendered before a decision was made on the Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs had no opportunity to respond since on the 7th day
of October the Court entered an Order Vacating the Judgment.
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Plaintiff's counsel filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss or for a Directed Verdict on the 8th of October, 1981.
On the 30th day of October, 1981, the Court rendered a
Memorandum Decision granting the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
as to Tenhoeve.

Thereafter, the Court entered an Order of

Dismissal as to Tenhoeve and vacated the jury verdict against
Defendant Tenhoeve.

From this Memorandum Decision and order,

the Plaintiffs have appealed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the decision of the lower court
reversed wherein, in spite of the jury verdict against the
Defendant Tenhoeve, the Court dismissed the action amd vacated
the Verdict as to Tenhoeve.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Prior to September, 1979, Defendants Brown and Tenhoeve
contacted the Jepsens about selling their farm at Mink Creek,
Idaho.

The proposal was that Defendants Brown and Tenhoeve

would exchange the farm with a Mr. Balls for other property.
(R.T.65}

The Jepsens were induced to

reduc~

their price by

$15,000.00 which Defendants Brown and Tenhoeye represented would
be their real estate commission. (R.T. 4}

Tenhoeve was a licensed

real estate broker working for Countryside Properties. (R.T. 106}

-3-
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Due to the fact that Balls did not want the dairy herd,
Tenhoeve induced the Jepsens to sell the herd.

(R.T. 59-60)

They were reliant upon the herd for their income, grossing
over $8,000.00 per month of which $4,000.00 was gross profit used
primarily to pay mortgage expenses.
Tenhoeve and Brown signed an earnest money agreement in
their individual capacity although the name of Interwest Pacifie Corporation appeared at the top of the document.

(Exhibit 1)

It later appeared that Balls did not want the property
and an agreement was drafted by the Defendants' attorney whereby
the Jepsens would sell to Interwest Pacific Corporation.

The

nature of the corporation was not explained to them and they
supposed at all times that Tenhoeve and Brown were the purchasers.
(R.T. 68)

Although preliminary drafts were viewed by Jepsens'

attorneys, the final document containing considerable changes of
substance and importance to the Jepsens was signed in Defendants'
office at 7:00 p.m. when Jepsens' counsel was out of town.

There-

after, and within 6 weeks, Tenhoeve induced the Plaintiffs to
sell their young stock for $14,000.00 and then induced the FHA to
endorse the check over to

nf fendants.

( R. T. 57) Thus, by thi_s

I

I

device, the Defendants regained a substantial portion of the
$20,000.00 downpayment.
At the time the contracts were entered into, all Defendants,
including Tenhoeve, knew that Interwest Pacific could not perform on the contract unless it resold the property by the time
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a $110,000.00 payment became due in April of 1980.

The corp-

oration had no way of making that payment except by resell of
the property.

(R.T. L03)

Tenhoeve also testified that he

was not a licensed real estate broker for Idaho, where the
property was located, (R.T. 106) but denied that the way the
sale was set up was a gimmick to avoid the Defendant's lack of
an Idaho license.

The substance of the transaction, however,

indicates very clearly Interwest, through Brown and Tenhoeve,
entered into the agreement to purchase only with the idea of
resale.

Such a device would not have been necessary if the

Defendant Tenhoeve had been licensed in Idaho.
Shortly after the contract was executed, Tenhoeve tried
to sell some of the Jepsen equipment but·was prevented from
doing so by Mr. Jepsen.

(R.T. 98-99)

Although the final draft of the agreement executed by
the Jepsens at 7:00 p.m. in the absence of their counsel, provided for the release of the young stock and some hay for the
downpayment, the original documents did not so provide.
I

(Pltintiff 's Exhibit 2, 3) Further, the bill of sale which was
I

supposed to have gone into escrow provided that nothing, by
way of real or personal property, would be released to the
Defendant until the full purchase price was paid. (Plaintiff's
Exhibit 5)
Within six weeks of the final agreement, the Defendants
decided, in early January, 1980, to turn the property back to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the Jepsens.

(R. T. 102)

This was in spite of the fact that

they had until April to make the first payment of $110,000.00.
(R. T. 93)

Tenhoeve admitted receiving a letter dated February 27,
1980, alleging liability on the part of himself and Brown and
the real estate firm of Country Side Properties.
Tenhoeve made no response to the letter (R.T. 110)

However,
(Defendant's

Exhibit 2)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT ERRED IN VACATING THE VERDICT OF THE JURY AS
TO TENHOEVE WHEN NO PROPER MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WAS MADE.
Rule SO(b) clearly provides that .•••• "not later than 10

days after the entry of judgment a party who has moved for
a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have a judgment
entered in accordance with his motion for directed verdict ... "
This rule is designed to help streamline and implement
procedural niceties that are necessary to insure that a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict does not v~olate a
I

party's right to a jury trial.

The failure of a defendant

to move for a directed verdict at the close of all the
evidence as required by SO(b) bars later consideration of
its motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
(Guglielmo vs. Scotti & Sons 58 FRO 413(DC. PA. 1973)
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In the instant case, all Defendant Tenhoeve did was make
a motion to dismiss at the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence.
There never was a motion for a directed verdict at the close
of all the evidence.
II.

IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, WHETHER
OR NOT IT BE CONSIDERED A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT,
CAME TOO LATE.
Rule 58(a) provides that ... "Unless the court otherwise

directs, and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment
upon the verdict of jury shall be forthwith signed by the
.clerk and filed .... "
The Court made no direction either written or oral that
the Verdict should not be entered.

"In the absence of a con-

trary direction by the court, it is the duty of the clerk to
enter judgment forthwith on a general verdict, and judgment
should not be postponed until the amount of costs can be
determined."

Danzig vs. Virgin Isle Hotel

278 F2d 580 (CA

3rd 1960))
Since the clerk's office had not.entered the Verdict and
since it should have been done so as a matter of course, t9e

Judgment presented to the Court was simply a direction- to

~he
I

clerk to enter the Verdict nunc pro tune as of the date it was
rendered.

It is therefore submitted that the Court should not

have set aside that Verdict ex parte without notice to Plaintiff's counsel.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

Further, the Court specifically stated after the verdict
had been rendered, that counsel for the Defendant Tenhoeve
had fifteen days in which to file any further motions.

Nothing

was filed until September 28, 1981, more than a month after
the Jury rendered its Verdict.

Even at that time no motion

was filed, but only a memorandum.
III. THE COURT ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE THE VERDICT AGAINST
TENHOEVE SINCE THERE WAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT AGAINST HIM.
"Judgment notwithstanding the verdict cannot be granted
where there are .factual issues for the jury to decide and it
cannot be said that no reasonable man would hold as ·the jury
did."

Williams vs. Capital Transit Co.

215 F2d 487 (DC. APP

1954)
There is abundant evidence that Tenhoeve was acting as a
principal.

He was sued in his individual capacity.

He did not

object to a letter directed to him contending that he was
individually liable (R.T. 110)

He didn't object to the insur-

ance being in his personal name. (R.T. 142)

(Exhibit 8)

He

knew that the corporation was defunct and that it could not
perform at the time it entered into the agreements with the
Jepsen's. (R.T. 103)

He also signed the Earnest Money Receipt

in his individual capacity. (Exhibit 1)

(R.T. 105)
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The above were all facts from which the Jury could easily
have concluded that there was individual liability on the
part of Mr. Tenhoeve.

He also acted as a real estate salesman

and told the Jepsens that they were reducing the asking price
$15,000.00 to take care of his commission.

(R.T. 4)

Further, Mrs. Jepsen testified that they did not know they
were dealing with a corporation as the purchaser since she
thought Interwest Pacific was some sort of financing agency.
(R.T. 24)

She testified, under oath, that she always thought

that Brown and Tenhoeve were the Buyers.

(R.T. 24)

The jury

apparently believed at least some of the factual assertions set
forth above and the Court, therefore, erred in vacating the
Verdict against Tenhoeve.
"A party is not entitled to judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or to a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
against the weight of the evidence unless there can be but one
reasonable conclusion without weighing the credibility of the
witnesses."

Eisenberg vs. Smith

263 F2d 827 (CA 3rd 1959)

There is also considerable evidence that Plaintiffs were
induced to sell their dairy herd and suffered considerable
damages thereby by the representations of Tenhoeve.

The

evidence clearly showed that Tenhoeve was acting as an independent real estate agent, as well as individually, and as a

-9-
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corporate officer, and the jury could very easily have found
personal liability based on those uncontradicted facts.
"A trial court is justified in pre-empting a jury's verdict
only when it has no foundation in fact and the court, 1n the
exercise of judicial discretion, would be required to set it
aside.

To be insufficient to support a verdict, the evidence

must all be one way from which only one reasonable inference
can be drawn.

U.S. vs. Hess

341 F2d 444 (CA 10 1965)

"It is only where there is complete absence of probative
facts to support the conclusion reached by the jury that the
verdict may be ignored."
Mutual Insurance

Plainter's Manufacturing vs. Protection

380 F2d 869 (CA 5 1967)

"A judgment notwithstanding the verdict should not be
granted unless the evidence, together with all inferences that
can be drawn therefrom, is so one-sided that reasonable men
could not disagree on the verdict.

This means that a judgment

for defendant notwithstanding the verdict can be affirmed only
if the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff

is such that all reasonable men would agr\e that defendant was
not liable."

O'Neil vs. W. R. Grace & Co.

1
•

410 F2d 908. (CA 5

1969)
"In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, or a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the court must take
the view of the evidence most favorable to the party against
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whom the motion is made, and determine whether the evidence
is legally sufficient to take the case to the jury or to
support the verdict."

Wilson vs. Nu-Car Carriers, Inc.

256 F2d 332 (CA 3 1958)
IV.

CONCLUSION
As appears from the record, no proper Motion for a

Directed Verdict was ever made.

Even the written Memorandum,

filed more than a month after the return of the verdict, was
only a memorandum in support of a motion which was never made
orally or in writing.

Further, there was an abundance of

evidence to support the Verdict against Mr. Tenhoeve.

There

is no legal requirement known to counsel which would require
that the Verdict against Mr. Tenhoeve and that against the
corporation be in exactly the same amounts.
IT IS THEREFOR RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED that the Court's
Order setting Aside the Verdict should be reversed and the
Jury Verdict against Mr. Tenhoeve be reinstated.
DATED this

c:;~

day of February, 1982.
,...,

---

w.

Scott Barrett
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregong Appellant's Brief on Appeal was mailed to James C.
Jenkins, Attorney for Defendant/Appellee, at 150 East 200 North,
Suite o, Logan, Utah 84321, this c:fl.~
day of February, 1982.
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Winona Perry
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